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The  1985 Food Security Act is designed to make agricultural  com-
modities more  competitive in the world market. This is to be  accom-
plished by lowering the loan rate level, reducing its effectiveness as a
price  floor,  and/or providing  payment-in-kind  (PIK) certificates.  The
rice and cotton programs'  objectives  are to protect farm income and
to lower carryover stocks to workable  levels through the use of mar-
keting loans and a competitive price.
New  Program Concepts
Changes in the farm bill  have implications  on market  prices, the
amount of government payments to farmers, and effectiveness of the
loan rate  in establishing  a market  price  floor.  The  loan rate  was
effective  in setting a price floor  in previous  farm programs.  During
the  1980s this floor  price,  along  with a strong  dollar,  pushed  U.S.
crop price levels above those of the world and stocks increased signifi-
cantly.  To  lower the loan rate, however, would make the $50,000 pay-
ment  limit  increasingly  restrictive  and  discourage  program
participation.
The rice marketing loan program was implemented  as of April 15,
1986, for the 1985 crop as well as the new crop. Although the cotton
program  was  announced  in  early  1986, it  did  not  become  effective
until  August  1 for the  1986  crop.  A  marketing  loan  program  was
authorized  to bypass the payment limit and allow U.S.  commodities
to compete in international  markets.  Because the cotton marketing
loan was announced  well in advance of implementation,  it created an
unusual market situation. This caused some sales to be delayed until
after August 1. Less than 2 million bales were exported in the 1985-
86 marketing year as buyers waited for a price drop that turned out
to be 40 cents per pound.
471986 Rice Program
The general provisions of the 1986 rice program are summarized in
Table  1.
Table 1. Comparison of  1985 and 1986  Rice Program Provisions
Program Provision  1985  1986
Target Price  ($/cwt.)  11.90  11.90
Loan  Rate ($/cwt.)  8.00  7.20
Maximum  Deficiency  Payment ($/cwt.)  3.90  4.70
Minimum  Loan Repayment ($/cwt.)  NA  3.60
Acreage  Reduction  20%  35%
Paid  Land Diversion  15%  0%
Advance  Deficiency  Payment ($/cwt.)  1.90  1.41
The marketing loan provision of the 1986 rice program is a simpler
mechanism  than that established  for  cotton.  A  producer  who  com-
plies  with  the  program  provisions  may  redeem  rice  placed  under
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loan at (1)  the prevailing world
market price, as determined by the Secretary  of Agriculture,  or (2) 50
percent  of the loan rate for  1986-87  crops ($3.60/cwt.),  whichever  is
higher.  In no case  may the loan be repaid at a rate higher than the
announced  loan level (Glaser, p.  22).
Should the world market price,  as announced by the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA), result in a loan repayment level
below the minimum $3.60/cwt.,  producers will be eligible for generic
negotiable  marketing  certificates.  The  certificate's  value  will  be
equal  to the  difference  between  the  loan  repayment  rate  and the
prevailing  world market  price multiplied by the quantity of eligible
rice redeemed.  The certificates issued under this provision would be
valid for eight  months from the last day  of the month  in which  the
certificate was issued.
An  example  of the  way the program would operate,  including the
PIK provision,  is presented in Table  2.  The example  assumes a 100-
acre rice base and hypothetical  prices and yields.
1986  Cotton Program
The  1985  Food Security  Act provides  the Secretary of Agriculture
with the flexibility  of implementing  a loan  repayment program  un-
der two alternatives called  Plan A and Plan B. If the secretary  esti-
mates  that the world  market price  will be  less than  the loan  rate,
then the secretary must choose either Plan A or Plan B  for determi-
nation of the loan repayment rate.
Under  Plan  A,  the  loan repayment  rate  can  be  fixed at  a  level
between  80 percent  and  100 percent  of the loan rate  and cannot  be
changed  for the marketing year. Under Plan B, the loan repayment
48Table 2. Rice Program Example
Item
1.  Target Price  ($/cwt.)  11.90
2.  National  Average Loan Rate ($/cwt.)  7.20
3.  Minimum Loan Repayment Rate ($/cwt.)  3.60
4.  World  Price ($/cwt.)  3.40
5.  Farm  Price ($/cwt.)  3.50
6.  Deficiency  Payment Rate ($/cwt.)*  4.70
7.  Program Payment  Yield (cwt./acre)  49.0
8.  Harvested Yield (cwt./acre)  58.0
9.  Base Acreage  (acres)  100.0
10.  Permitted (harvested) acres  65.0
11.  Production (cwt.)  3,770.0
12.  Income Factors:
a.  Loan Proceeds ($)  [11 x 2]  +27,144
b.  Less Loan Repayment  ($)  [11 x 3]  -13,572
c.  Plus Certificate  Value ($)  [11  x (3 - 4)]  +754
d.  Plus Market Value  ($)  [11  x 5]  +13,195
e.  Plus Deficiency Payments  ($)  [6 x  7 x 10]  +  14,970
f.  Equals  bTtal  Income ($)  42,491
13.  Variable Costs  of Production ($)  [10 x $225]  14,625
14.  Net Income ($)  [12f-  13]  27,866
*Payments  are  subject  to  $50,000  payment  limitation.  Payments  received  under  marketing loan  program  and
marketing certificate  program are not subject to payment limitation.
rate would fluctuate with the world market  price.  The Secretary  of
Agriculture  selected Plan A and elected to lower the loan repayment
level by the maximum 20 percent  below the announced loan rate for
the  1986 crop.
When  a  loan  repayment  rate  less than the loan rate  is  in  effect,
loan deficiency payments will be paid to eligible producers who agree
to forego loan eligibility at a rate equal to the difference between the
loan rate and the loan repayment  rate. The loan deficiency  payment
is not subject to the $50,000 payment  limit. Fifty percent  of the loan
Table 3. Basic Cotton Price Example  Structure Under the 1986 Cotton Program
$.81  Target Price  $.26  Maximum  Deficiency  Payment is
$.55  Base Loan Rate  subject to $50,000 individual  limit.
$.26 Maximum Deficiency  Payment
$.55  Base Loan Rate  $.11  Loan  Deficiency Payment  to
$.44  80% Loan  Repayment Rate  producer  who foregoes  loan, no
$.11  Loan Deficiency  Payment  payment  limit.
-half  in cash
-half  in certificate redeemable
in cotton
$.44 80% Loan Repayment Rate  $.20  Difference in Loan Repayment
$.24 Adjusted  World Price  Rate and  adjusted price paid to
of U.S.  Cotton*  first handler in certificate
$.20  Difference in Loan  redeemable  in CCC cotton for
Repayment  Rate (First  9 months only.
Handler Certificate)
*This  figure  will change  each  week  in line with  Northern  European  Price  adjusted  to  U.S.  location  and  base
quality (41-34, 3.5-4.9  mike).
NOTE:  Example does not include 4.3 percent reductions due to Gramm-Rudman.
49deficiency payment will be paid in cash and 50 percent in commodity
certificates redeemable only  in cotton.
Table  3  shows the  relationship  of the 81-cent  target price  to the
base  loan rate  of 55  cents  with a maximum  26-cent  deficiency  pay-
ment.  The 80 percent  loan repayment  rate is 44 cents, which results
in an  11-cent loan deficiency payment.
The  example  assumes  an  adjusted  world  price  of  24  cents  per
pound.  Thus, the difference  between  the repayment  rate  and world
price is 20 cents. As a result, the first handler certificate  has a value
of 20  cents for  each  pound purchased.  The certificate  is redeemable
only in CCC cotton for nine months.
If the adjusted  world  price  is below  the loan  repayment  level (80
percent of base loan), the CCC must issue negotiable marketing cer-
tificates  to first handlers  of cotton.  The  value  of the certificates  is
based  on  the  difference  between  the  loan repayment  rate  and the
adjusted world market price.
Determining Adjusted World Price for U.S.  Cotton
The procedure  for determining the adjusted world price of U.S. up-
land cotton  is based upon  the average  quotations  for  the preceding
Friday through  Thursday  for  Middling  (M)  1-3/32  inch  cotton (cost,
insurance, freight)  in Northern  Europe.  The Northern  Europe  price
is adjusted to average  U.S.  location  by deducting the average differ-
ence  for  a  156-week  period,  excluding  June, July  and August  each
year, between price quotations for Memphis Territory and California/
Arizona  M 1-3/32  inch cotton in Northern  Europe and average  price
quotations  in the United  States.  This  price  is further  adjusted  for
quality and location  by using the U.S. loan rate schedule.
The  adjusted world price  is determined  weekly and announced  by
USDA  after 4:00  p.m.  Eastern  Time  each  Thursday.  The  adjusted
price is subject to further adjustments (coarse count) for any grade of
upland  cotton with  a  staple  of 1 inch  or  shorter  or for  any  staple
length of upland cotton with a grade which has a price  support loan
discount for grade and staple of 8 cents per pound or higher.
The use of negotiable commodity certificates redeemable in upland
cotton is authorized under several  provisions of the 1986 upland  cot-
ton program. Certificates  include inventory protection, first handler,
loan  deficiency,  additional  yield  and  generic.  Inventory  protection
payments were  made to anyone  holding free stocks  of cotton on Au-
gust 1, 1986, to offset for the price drop to the world price.  The certifi-
cates will expire in nine months.
First handler  certificates will be  issued basically  on 1986-crop  up-
land cotton purchased directly from producers.  Merchants,  cotton co-
50operatives  and  producers  selling  direct  to  mills  or  for  export  are
eligible  for  approval  as first handlers.  However,  as with  inventory
adjustment certificates,  first handler certificates can be used only to
obtain upland cotton under loan for nine months.
Differences  in Rice and Cotton Marketing Loans
The  marketing  loan  programs  for rice  and  cotton  are  somewhat
different in their implementation  for the 1986 crop. While the basic
market impacts are similar, the procedures and interactions of reach-
ing a world competitive  price are not the same. The loan repayment
rate for  1986 cotton is handled under Plan A wherein producers may
repay  their  loans  at  80  percent  of the announced  base  loan  of 55
cents. And, when the adjusted world price is less than the repayment
rate, the difference is made up in cotton PIK certificates to first han-
dlers.
As previously  stated, for rice,  producers may  repay their loans at
the prevailing world market price, or 50 percent of the loan rate. The
Secretary of Agriculture  may offer negotiable  marketing certificates
and cash  if the  world  price  drops  below the  50 percent  repayment
rate.
The cotton marketing loan, with 80 percent repayment  levels and
PIK, tends to expose  the government  to less direct cash outlay and
the producer to less Gramm-Rudman.  Program payments  go to both
producers  and merchants and the market price to growers is higher
when adjusted world price is below loan repayment rate. The higher
price  "floor"  to growers that gravitates  toward the repayment  rate
might  encourage plantings  outside the  program.  With a  fixed  loan
repayment rate for the season, if world price  goes above it, then gov-
ernment  cost  increases.  First handler  certificates  may  be  large  to
high volume traders.
Under the market  loan provisions  for rice,  government  cost  expo-
sure  is limited when  world price  rises  since there  is no fixed  loan
repayment  level. Payments distributed over a wide area to producers
rather  than  a relatively  few  large  merchant  businesses  are  fairly
simple to administer, compared with the cotton program's loan repay-
ment  to producers  foregoing the  loan  and  PIK  certificates  to  first
handlers.  With  the 50  percent  repayment  level  for rice,  there  is  a
greater  incentive  for  program  participation  when  prices  are  low.
However,  there is a large direct government  cash outlay when prices
are depressed.  Also, the exposure to a large Gramm-Rudman  impact
is greater than for cotton.
While the marketing  loan programs  differ in provisions for imple-
mentation,  both  commodities  are  trading  in the  world  market  at
51competitive price levels. The cotton marketing loan is rapidly reduc-
ing CCC loan stocks because certificates  are redeemable  only in cot-
ton.  And,  because  of  the  delayed  implementation  of  the  cotton
marketing loan, purchases  of U.S. cotton  have been bunched  at the
start of the 1986 marketing year.
Results of Marketing Loan to Date
Rice.  The  institution  of the rice marketing  loan  in April has pro-
duced some  interesting results in the export of U.S.  rice. While  ini-
tial signals  are  positive,  several  caveats  must be  raised  to  prevent
reaching too optimistic conclusions  from these short-term results.
As presented in Figure 1, the initial impact of the marketing loan
for rice has been to bring the price relationship  between the United
States  and Thailand  back  into line with the  condition  of the early
1980s when  U.S.  rice export  volume  was at  its peak.  During  1981,
the difference  between U.S. #2 milled 4 percent bagged rice and Thai-
land  100  percent  grade  A  bagged  rice,  cost  and freight  Rotterdam,
was under  $20  per metric ton  and, during  one  month,  narrowed to
within $1. By July of 1985, the price gap between U.S. and Thai rice
had jumped to $240 per metric ton. Since the institution of the mar-
keting loan, the price difference has eased considerably,  and U.S. rice
is trading at about a $5 per ton premium.
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Figure 2,  US. Rice Export  Sales and I.oan  Repayment Levels  1986
As indicated in Figure 2, the decline in U.S. price was followed by a
dramatic  increase in export sales volume.  Measured on a four-week
moving average basis, U.S.  export rice sales increased  from a low of
3,906 metric tons in mid-March to around 67,000 metric tons by mid-
May.  The  four-week  moving  average  has remained  in the 35,000  to
4-…  -
77,000  metric  ton  range  since  then.  This  increase  in  sales  activity
resulted  following  the loan  repayment  rate  decline  from  $8 to  the
$3.50  to $3.70  range.  While this initial response  leads to optimistic
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expectationFigure  2. U.S. Rice Export Sales  and Loan Repayment Levels  1986sary.
As indicated in  ire  t  the  lowering of the loan  U.S. price  and,  hence, mar-
ket  pramatice  levels led to direct  increase  in export  sales volume.  Measured  on a four-week
somewhat by the general pattern of sales over time. As illustrated in
moving average basis, U.S.  export rice  sales  nerally  shown  a  modest  up-w  of
3,90swing  in the final weeks of  the  marketing year. The  four-weekns  by mov-
May. The  four-week  moving  average  ofas  remadurined  inJuly  of 1983-84  and 1984-85
has consistently exceeded April and May sales. In addition, the aver-
age  sales in March  and April of 1985-86  were  surprisingly  low by
77,000 metric  ton  ranThis  evidence  then.at  theThis  increase  in sales  activity
resulactivity  following  the  lowering of  repayment  rate  dbeen  at  leasth
$3.50 to $3.70 range. While this initial response  leads to optimistic
expectations, some further analysis is necessary.
The degree to which the lowering of the loan rate and, hence, mar-
ket price  levels led to direct increases  in export sales  is diminished
somewhpartiallt by the general pattern of  delayed purchases over time. As illustrated in  made
earlier  had the  market not  anticipated the  rally shupcoming  price  modelines.t  up-
swing in the final weeks  of the marketing year. The four-week  mov-
ing average  of sales during June  and July  of 1983-84  and 1984-85
has consistently exceeded April and May sales. In addition, the aver-
age  sales  in March  and April  of 1985-86  were surprisingly  low by
historic  standards.  This evidence  suggests that the increased  sales
activity following the lowering of U.S. prices may have been at least
partially the result of delayed purchases that would have been made
earlier had the market not anticipated the upcoming price declines.
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Another significant  factor is the increased purchases  by  Brazil re-
sulting  from a  severe  drought.  While the  lower U.S.  price  undoubt-
edly  was  a  factor  in the  Brazilian  purchases,  the  marketing  loan
program has no effect on Brazilian weather. Barring a continued crop
shortfall, these purchases would not be expected in future years.
Finally, some analysts have suggested that the decline in the U.S.
dollar over the 1985-86 period may have led to some increased  activ-
ity. For rice, this does not seem to be a major factor. The currencies of
many of the United States' largest rice customers,  such as Iraq and
Saudi Arabia, have not declined while others have seen only modest
declines.
In summary, the marketing loan program for rice has been followed
by a general upsurge  in export sales, that much is certain.  What is
still in debate is whether the initial increase will be sustainable. The
United  States has  lost  some  significant  markets  in the  past  few
years.  As  indicated  in  Table  4,  purchases  by  countries  other  than
those listed have dropped dramatically  since  1981-82.
Most notable among those have been the loss of Nigeria and Korea.
Exports to Korea and Nigeria in 1981-82 were equal to 38 percent of
the total  U.S.  exports in 1985-86.  Korea has not imported any  rice
since  1984, while Nigeria has cut back on imports from 666,000 met-
ric tons in  1982 to 100,000  metric tons in 1986,  but has purchased
those  imports from other suppliers.  The trend toward increased  pro-
duction  and  a greater  degree  of self-sufficiency  in Asia  and  other
areas  is going to continue in the future.
54D  O00  CM4  0  cc  OS
t;  a  C.  os  N O  C ;
O  c  00  CD  )  -re  -
0  .0  . C  C  00  . .
t6  o6  l4  (0  O  00  j eq  w  '  N  m  c  -4
CID  C  - r-4
N  i  C  O  I  0  D  c  0  e cc  't  m  cc  cc  N  - cit
cq  cq  -1
--  t-sIeq  O  o  tr -
cq  ,  o  c  t-c
. CC  CM t^  O  d)  fD <  CD  ,10  ,  00  r *  rq  C_  M  C  '  C  I  c  I  c  c  cO a'  -- O  eq  eq  e  c  'eq c  c  _
OS  O  0  C  00  OS  ccc  -S  t  'o-  U
4  C4
,o  osoH  o6  ocs  .~  V3  . o  o  oo  aw
C*  - - CD  _  '  CO  C  '  C  I  C  eO
LU  CO  o  Cq  00  0  m  O  m  CO  Um  C  m
16  c.i  C'  . 4  . .4  . . . . . c  . . . t
e  i  S  CD D  e  C  I  I  i  C4  CD 00
e
Cm  N  00  0O Ca  N  t  N  0  CD 00  "i  tC
ON  O  t  _  i  _  t  N  _O  It  m  C  N  CN  CO  0
l"  td  O  0  0  _  m  CD to  CY 0  0  0  OS  Cq
t4'  - ei  -O  oC  - e  Lc  ct0  6  - c c  's
_Cce  -i  o  t  cc  to  CO  0  C  cO  c  c c  0  c
C  c  eq  c  eqo  t  C_-  eo  c  cc  cc  o  c  c  crS
s  LO  >  cq  C4  m  V  cco
C3  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  d  r4~~~~~~e
cc~~~~ ~  ~  ~  ~ - ct-c  cc  c  c-  e  qt
- q c  '  c  cc  - c  0  r-  e  cc  '  IO  c  - c - c o-  cq  cc  ' c  cc
O  c  c  r  r  t  C  r-O  a  - _  cc  c  c  m  Cc  c  - 0  c  t-  c  q  0  O  CD  Io  0  0  c
cc--cco~~~~§  t  Ic  cc  ~-  ~  ~  -- o
3 m  a  3  m  z  E  4  E  A  A  O  45  o3  coz ·re  · r r  '6b  E3 B  0'C  5 S






























uCotton. The 40-cent-per-pound  drop in U.S. cotton prices on August
1 triggered  a tremendous  volume  of sales.  Export commitments  by
the  end  of August  were  near  4  million  bales,  compared  with  total
shipments  of  1.85  million in  the  1985  season.  Domestic  sales  also
have  increased at a rapid pace.  Of course,  economic principles  indi-
cate  that  with  about  a  60  percent  decrease  in  price,  consumption
should increase.
The price decline,  however,  seems to have bottomed out. Therefore,
if prices  increase,  it would  be expected that sales will  slow.  The big
uncertainty is how much? Domestic cotton use is expanding. In addi-
tion, the marketing loan gives U.S.  mills a much lower price to com-
pete with foreign  textile imports.
Since raw cotton  imports  are restricted,  U.S. mills have been at a
severe  competitive  disadvantage.  As shown  in  Figure  4, they  were
paying  25  to  30  cents  more  per pound for  cotton  in  mid-1986  than
foreign mills.  They  also  were  competing  against  a  large  volume  of
textile imports further encouraged  by the strong dollar.  With a lower
price and weaker dollar,  domestic use should climb to at least 7 mil-
lion bales, up from 6.4 million in 1985.
The market  loan gives a slight advantage to U.S. mills as the aver-
age  landed  costs as adjusted in the world price formula  are greater
than costs of moving cotton to mills from most U.S. production areas.
The surge in export sales is likely to slow because many of the best
customers by late August have bought large quantities of U.S. cotton.
As  shown in Table  5,  major  customers  except  for Canada  have  pur-
chased  more cotton  already than in  1985. It is reasonable  to believe
that  many  mills  had  their  needs  covered  well  into  1987  by  early
September.
Japan has purchased  40 percent  more cotton than last season and
about  50 percent  of the average  purchases for the past five  seasons.
The purchases already  equal almost 25 percent of total expected con-
sumption.  They  usually  buy  about  50  percent  of their total  cotton
needs of about 3 million bales from the United States. Japanese buy-
ers prefer to spread out purchases and other exporting countries still
appear  capable  of delivering  cotton at  the  low  world  prices.  It  ap-
pears reasonable  to expect U.S. purchases  from Japan to  slow.
Total purchases by South Korea of 878,000 bales may be close to 70
percent  of expected  U.S.  volume and more than half of normal total
imports.  If U.S.  imports reached  about 80  percent  of the total, then
only  another 400,000  bales  may be needed  from the United States.
Taiwan purchases  are  at a  level  of more  than 50  percent  of the  ex-
pected consumption  and near the highest  level  of U.S. purchases  in
recent times.  Hence, Taiwanese  buying may turn slow.










1980/81  1981/82  1982/83  1983/84  1984/85  1985/86  1986/87
YEAR
O  "A"  Index  +  "B"  Index  o  U.S.  Spot  Mkts.
On  balance,  U.S.  exports  for  the  1986  season  are  very  likely  to
approach  the  7  million bale  level.  That indicates  many  of the  key
export markets for U.S. cotton were well covered after the first month
of the new marketing year. Sales over the next eleven months may be
spread out over time.
Table  6  illustrates  that the  marketing  loan  certainly  increased
sales when the new program started. The marketing loan began with
record cotton supplies and a very  weak market.  Several years  of in-
creasing  foreign  production,  a  very  strong dollar  and  large  textile
imports  set the stage for market forces to drive U.S. prices to a low
level. Low prices should encourage  demand.  How, and how fast, state
and  centrally-planned  governments  react  to  low  prices  for  adjust-
ments  in  production  is  somewhat  difficult  to  anticipate.  The  U.S.
program of target prices will maintain a strong incentive to push for
high yields on acreage planted.  Therefore,  a fairly high  level of pro-
duction  can be expected.
Conclusion
Even with the marketing loan, the level of world trade in rice may
increase  only moderately,  if any,  in the next few years.  As a result,
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58Table 6.  U.S.  Upland  Cotton Export Sales  and Exports, in Running Bales,  for Week  and
Year, Marketing Years  1985-1986  and 1986-87
Marketing Year
1985-86  1986-87
Description  Through August 29  Through  August 28
Week  Marketing Year  Week  Marketing  Year
Outstanding sales  - 1,085,100  - 3,501,600
Exports  34,800  162,800  127,600  373,200
Total Export Commitments  - 1,257,900  - 3,874,800
New  Sales  9,400  - 208,800
Buy-Backs &  Cancellations  12,400  - 7,000
Net Sales  -3,000  - 201,800
Sales Next Marketing Year  - 11,100  14,600  57,200
Source:  Export Sales Reporting  Division, Foreign Agricultural  Service,  USDA.
the United States will likely face a continuing problem in maintain-
ing export markets  for rice.  The marketing loan program  will make
U.S.  rice competitive  in world  markets but will likely have little ef-
fect on production trends worldwide.  Barring fluctuations  in market
demand  due to  disastrous  weather,  a tough  road  lies ahead  for the
rice industry to expand exports.
At the beginning of the 1986 marketing year under the cotton mar-
keting loan,  indications  suggest  U.S.  sales will  be  large.  The  sales
partly result from purchases  delayed from 1985.  For the longer run,
however,  a  competitive  price  only  opens  the  door  for  maintaining
markets.  It does  not assure  that the  U.S.  cotton industry  can fully
compete  in the world market  dominated by state trading countries.
The  level of exports depends largely on the relative costs of produc-
tion and marketing,  the level  of U.S.  government support  and each
exporting  country's  desire  to maintain  and  subsidize  their agricul-
tural industry in order to generate trade dollars.
The marketing loan  concept is necessary to effectively  compete  in
the world market but may not be  sufficient.  The marketing loan re-
moves the U.S. price  umbrella over world markets, yet it provides  a
safety net on farm income. Further, the level of supply management
is reduced,  though  not  eliminated.  Smaller  carryover  and  govern-
ment stocks are  possible.  The total economy  benefits  from the  eco-
nomic  activity  associated  with  a  larger-sized  agricultural  industry
and a more highly productive U.S. agriculture results.  However, dur-
ing periods  of depressed  prices,  prudent  marketing  incentives  are
lost since  government  absorbs costs below  loan rates.  The  competi-
tive  prices assist U.S.  textile  mills to better  cope  with low  cost  im-
ports.  The  marketplace  will  signal  foreign  competitors  to  share  in
adjusting production  levels.
In the  international  trade  arena,  the marketing  loan  impact  has
some  limitations.  American  farm  exports  compete  largely  against
59foreign governments that historically  have been willing to subsidize
their producers and exports.  As a result, foreign agricultural produc-
tion trends are up. Farmers in the United States must rely on highly
productive  operations to compete  against  low cost foreign labor with
rapidly  improving technology.
The  need  to  develop  strong trade  policies  and trade  agreements
remains  central  to  maintaining  expanding  exports.  The  relative
strength  of the  dollar  compared  with  currencies  of other  trading
countries  is  also extremely  important  to the flow  of trade.  For rice
and cotton to compete with foreign production,  a balanced program of
macroeconomic  policy,  coordinated  trade  policies  and  a  market-
sensitive but  flexible  farm policy  needs  to be  packaged,  supported
and implemented.
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